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Introduction
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 Intrusion detection systems
 Evolution and improvement 
 => Attack improvement
 => undetected 
 Anomaly based NIDS
 Detection method known
 packet elements used to build model of normal
 Mimicry attack
 mimics normal packets – in used elements
Related Work
 PAYL [Wang04,05]
 Model - single payload bytes frequencies
 Anagram [Wang06]
 Model - fixed length payload byte sequences  (n-grams)
 Simple (fast) anomaly score calculation
 new n-gram/all n-gram in packet payload
 Language model ...[Rieck07]
 Payload divided into words
 byte sequence between delimiters
 Comparable accuracy to n-grams
 Smaller computational load
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Proposed Detection Method
 Words based
 Word transitions, also
 Resistant  to some attacks in training data
 Prevents mimicry
 Introduce key
Kerckhoffs’ principle [Kerckhoffs, 1883]
 Shannon’s maxim [Shannon, 1949]
Open design principle [Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975]
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Set of Delimiters - Key
 Set of “normal” words depends on selection of 
delimiters
 Selected set of delimiters determines model of 
normal packet payload
 The same model creation method and different 
delimiters set => different model
 Set of delimiters – Key
 Method – public
 Set of delimiters - secret
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Learning
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 Normal, attack free, payloads - partitioned into 
words.
 Model of normal packet:
 Word frequency distribution
 Word transition frequency distribution
 Training phase
 Appearance of any word is counted and stored
 Appearance of any pair of words is counted and stored.
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Detection
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 Word based score
 k – number of words in payload
 n(wi) - number of appearances of the word wi in learned model
 Tolerant to some attacks in training data
 Transition based score
 m – number of word transitions in a payload
 n(ti) - number of times transition ti occurred during training
 Total score S = Sw * St
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Testing
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 Used HTTP traffic and attacks
 Real university department traffic
 Cleaned using Snort and manual inspection
 Metasploit for attacks
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Initial Set of Delimiters
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 From [Rieck07]
CR LF TAB SPACE , . : / \ & ? = ( ) [ ] " ; < >
 Number of learned words
 Levels after 96 hours of traffic
 Around 33000
 Number of transitions
 33000 x 33000 matrix
 Too much
 Some words are very rare
 Use only words that appear more than 10 times
 80 times smaller matrix
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Test attacks (part)
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No. Vulnerability / payload CVE
1 Apache Chunked-Encoding / meterpreter-reverse_tcp 2002-0393
2 Apache Chunked-Encoding / shell-reverse_http 2002-0394
3 Apache mod_jk overflow / adduser 2007-0775
4 Apache mod_rewrite / shell-bind_tcp 2006-3748
5 Apache mod_rewrite /vncinject-reverse_tcp 2006-3749
6 IIS 5.0 IDQ Path Overflow / shell-reverse_http 2001-0501
7 IIS 5.0 IDQ Path Overflow / shell-reverse_tcp 2001-0502
8 IIS ISAPI w3who.dll / exec 2004-1135
9 IIS ISAPI w3who.dll / shell-reverse_tcp 2004-1136
10 Oracle 9i XDB HTTP PASS / shell-reverse_tcp 2003-0728
11 Xitami If_Mod_Since / shell-reverse_tcp 2007-5068
Attacks with related vulnerability and used payload
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ROC curve
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Arbitrary Set of Delimiters
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 Different sets of delimiters
 Different number of delimiters in set
 15, 20, 25, 30
 30 different sets of each size
 Total of 120
 Random choice of delimiters
 Function “rand” to generate number 0 - 255
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Results
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 Number of learned words
 Levels after 96 hours of traffic (again)
 40000 – 50000 (20 to 50% increase)
 Number of transitions
 Again, some words are very rare
 Use only words that appear more than 10 times
 Matrix of managable size
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ROC curves
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Conclusion
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 Implementation of open design principle
 Now HTTP – others should work too
 Protocol independent
 Key selection should be further tested
 Keyed IDS is the main idea
 There might be better implementations
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